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Privacy and the Post-September 11 Immigration
Detainees: The Wrong Way to a Right (and Other
Wrongs)
SADIQ REZA*
[The detainees] can make their identity public, if they wish to.'
Amnesty International is concerned that some [post-9/J 1] de-
tainees have been held under such secrecy that their families and
lawyers [have] had great difficulty in locating their whereabouts
and in taking the necessary steps in order to provide them with the
assistance and support they are entitled to under national and in-
ternational law. Some have experienced weeks and months of de-
lay before being notified of what charges they are being held un-
der-and whether the charges are criminal or INS related....
... [F]amily members .. , for weeks... have been unable to
establish if and where their loved ones were being held. Lawyers
have also had difficulty trying to establish where their clients are
held or when they have a hearing before the immigration court....
... [T]here were many [early] reports of detainees ... being
held effectively "incommunicado" in the initial stages after arrest,
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1Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General Ashcroft Provides Total Number of Federal
Criminal Charges and INS Detainees (Nov. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft], http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks1 l_27.htm (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
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as relatives and attorneys searched for their whereabouts. Infor-
mation . . . indicates that detainees' ability to maintain contact
with the outside world has been a persistent problem, extending
far beyond the initial period of detention. . . Some detainees have
reported problems in understanding their rights and how to exer-
cise them due to language difficulties.2
Privacy was the first reason the Department of Justice ("DOJ") gave
publicly for withholding the names of individuals detained for immigration
violations as a result of post-September 11, 2001 ("post-9/11") federal law-
enforcement initiatives.3 Soon thereafter, the DOJ released the names of
those detainees who were charged with criminal violations, and gave top
billing to a different reason for continuing to withhold the names of those
charged only with immigration violations: the desire not to aid Osama bin
Laden and his Al-Qaeda network by revealing which of their alleged asso-
ciates were in United States custody. But privacy remains one of the
DOJ's arguments for continuing to withhold the identities of post-9/1l
immigration detainees.5 Privacy, of course, is a creature of many different
2 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S
CONCERNS REGARDING POST SEPTEMBER I I DETENTIONS IN THE USA 5, 7, 15-16 (Mar. 2002) [here-
inafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT], available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc
/aidoc pdf.nsf/index/AMR510442002ENGLISH/$File/AMR5104402.pdf (on file with the Connecticut
Law Review).
3 See James Risen & David Johnston, Tape Reveals Wild Struggle on Flight 93, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2001, at BI (noting that identifying information in documents about post-9/l 1 detainees
released by the DOJ had been deleted "for privacy reasons"); Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston,
Jubilant Calls on Sept. 11 Led to F.B.L Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at Al (citing DOJ spokes-
person's statement that "privacy issues must [first] be resolved" with respect to information about post-
9/11 detainees).
4 See Ashcroft, supra note I (discussing both rationales); DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Free-
doms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing on Review of Military Terrorism Tribunals Before
the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001), Fed. News Serv., Nov. 28, 2001, LEXIS, Legis Library,
Fednews File (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice) [hereinafter Chertoff Testimony] (same).
5 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Center for Nat'l
Security Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 01-2500 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2002) [hereinafter DOJ FOIA
Memorandum], at 23-24:
DOJ's decision to withhold the requested information is necessary in order to protect the
privacy interests of the detainees themselves. The detainees-many of whom have or may
be cleared [sic] of any wrongdoing-have strong privacy interests in preventing disclosure
of certain information about themselves and their locations. Release of information regard-
ing the detainees could forever stigmatize them by associating them with the worst terrorist
incident in United States history, even if the detainees are ultimately cleared of any wrong-
doing.... [T]he mere mention of the detainees' names in connection with these [post-9/l I]
investigations may likely cause the detainees embarrassment, humiliation, risk of retaliation,
harassment and possibly even physical harm in the United States and in their home coun-
tries.
See also Defendants' Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and for Expedited Appeal, Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-70339, at 17 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2002) (arguing that closure of immigration
proceedings of post- 9/i I detainees is necessary to "avoid stigmatizing" the detainees since "the mere
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species in our law, spawned in federal and state judicial opinions,
nourished by statutes, and thriving in doctrinal areas as different from one
another as copyright law and criminal procedure. The DOJ grounds its
privacy argument in ihe "personal privacy" exemption to the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"), which authorizes the government'to withhold
information when disclosure might constitute "an unwarranted invasion of
privacy";6 this is a privacy interest of the "informational privacy" genus
that Warren and Brandeis conceived and Prosser later helped enshrine in
the common-law tort of invasion of privacy by "public disclosure of pri-
vate facts."7 In its modem form, this privacy interest is seen as an individ-
ual's interest in controlling information about himself.' Thus, the DOJ
defends withholding the names of post-9/11 detainees on the ground that
releasing them would violate the detainees' right to control information
about themselves.
In forthcoming work, I argue that this common-law privacy right
should indeed attach to individuals arrested for or suspected of crime.9 I
also argue that support for the right exists in a variety of judicial, statutory,
and other sources, and that legislation to formally protect the right is war-
mention of [their] names in connection with [post-9/l I] investigations may likely cause [them] embar-
rassment, humiliation" and other possible harm). "Immigration detainees" comprise the largest of the
three categories of post-9/1 I detainees; the other two categories are detainees charged criminally,
whose names the DOJ has mostly released, and those held as material witnesses, information about
whom the DOJ has stated is sealed by court order. See DOJ FOIA Memorandum, supra, at 8-11; see
also Second Supplemental Declaration of James S. Reynolds, Center for Nat'l Security Studies v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, No. 01-2500 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2002) (explaining that information about some crimi-
nally-charged detainees is sealed by court order). The DOJ's other arguments for withholding the
detainees' names, which this Article does not address, invoke concerns about national security and
public safety-viz., that releasing the names would compromise the government's post-9/11 terrorism
investigations by, among other things, revealing the nature and scope of the investigations; that the
safety of Americans would be endangered as a result; and that detainees themselves (and their families
and attorneys) might suffer in the United States or abroad as possible informants against terrorist asso-
ciates. See DOJ FOIA Memorandum, supra, at 14-23; see also infra note 20.
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX7) (2000).
7Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652(D) (invasion of privacy action lies when one "gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another ... if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public").
8 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989) ("[B]oth the common law and the literal understanding of privacy encompass the individ-
ual's control over information concerning his or her person."). It is thus distinct from constitutional
species of privacy: the fundamental right of personal autonomy affirmed in cases such as Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to obtain and use contraceptives) and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of woman to terminate pregnancy), often called "decisional pri-
vacy," and privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures and, in at least some views, the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, see, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1020-25 (1995) (identifying those interests).
9 Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect (forthcoming 2002).
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ranted and constitutional. The reasoning is simple: being publicly named
in connection with criminal allegations is stigmatizing, and the resultant
personal harm-social, professional, emotional, other-lasts, and is diffi-
cult to justify when it is visited upon someone who is acquitted of the
charges or against whom the charges are dismissed. Equally troubling is
that criminal arrestees and suspects are routinely named by police officials,
before a judge, or even a prosecutor, has considered the charges or the evi-
dence underlying them. I therefore urge, in the criminal context, legisla-
tion that (1) forbids government agents from identifying arrestees or sus-
pects until at least probable cause of guilt is found by a judge or grand jury,
unless the arrestees or suspects request otherwise, and (2) declares those
portions of government records that identify arrestees or suspects "non-
public" until such a finding is made. Such legislation would resemble
some of the statutory provisions that now protect the identities of sexual
assault complainants from public disclosure in some thirty states." The
proposal is, ultimately, for a right of temporary anonymity for criminal
arrestees and suspects, waivable by the arrestees or suspects themselves
and expiring at a threshold that is well-established as a trigger for the dep-
rivation of rights in the criminal context: a judicial determination of prob-
able cause of guilt.
Seen through this lens, the withholding of the names of the criminal
accusees among the post-9/11 detainees by the DOJ on privacy grounds
before a probable cause determination is reached is justifiable. Indeed, the
stigma of criminal accusation can only be greater with respect to post-9/11
detainees, particularly those charged with crimes related to the September
11 attacks, given the horror of that day and the breadth and intensity of the
public's attention to the ensuing law-enforcement efforts. Similar reason-
ing could support withholding the names of post-9/ 11 detainees accused
only of immigration violations. The DOJ has in fact based its privacy
argument on the very stigma and related harms that post-9/11 immigration
detainees might suffer from being named in relation to post-9/11 law-
enforcement efforts." But the DOJ's argument is problematic for several
reasons. First, the DOJ's decision to withhold the names of post-9/11 im-
migration detainees does not rest on the wishes of the detainees; the DOJ
refuses to name them whether or not they wish to be named. While many
detainees might prefer anonymity, the latest reports suggest that at least
some might wish to be named.' 2 And although DOJ. officials state that
detainees can "name themselves" if they wish, all indications are that the
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50-(b) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2001). For a listing of
statutes from each state, see Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of.Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Expla-
nation of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 433 & n.40 (1996).1 ISee DOJ FOIA Memorandum, supra note 5, at 23-24.
12 See infra text accompanying note 32.
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government has significantly impaired detainees' ability to do just that, by
limiting detainees' access to lawyers, family members, telephones, and
other means of communication with the public. 3 By deciding on its own
not to name detainees, and by impairing detainees' ability to name them-
selves, the DOJ thus does not necessarily advance a legitimate privacy
interest of the detainees, but it certainly inverts one: the essence of per-
sonal privacy is an individual's ability to control information about him-
self. Moreover, with respect to any detainee who wishes to be named,
FOIA's personal privacy exemption does not justify withholding his name
since naming him would not, by definition, invade his privacy. Finally,
and most disturbing, the latest reports suggest that the DOJ's privacy ar-
gument, along with the DOJ's other arguments for withholding detainees'
names, has worked to deprive detainees of a plethora of procedural rights
that are basic to our notions of due process and protected by domestic and
international rules. 4 In this way detainees' privacy interest has not only
been inverted, but perverted. In the end, the impression is inescapable that
the DOJ has withheld the names of post-9/11 detainees not to protect per-
sonal privacy but to promote government secrecy. Whatever justifications
there may be for such secrecy, the result has been an unprecedented and
unacceptable degree of official non-accountability with respect to the de-
tainees.
This Article accordingly argues that post-9/11 immigration detainees
may indeed have a privacy interest that justifies the withholding of their
names, but the DOJ has deprived them of that interest by deciding on its
own to withhold the names and substantially impairing detainees' ability to
name themselves. Worse, the DOJ's false privacy rationale has apparently
contributed to depriving the detainees of a plethora of other rights. Part I
defines the applicable privacy interest and exposes the fallacies of the
DOJ's privacy argument. Part II draws the link between the DOJ's privacy
argument and the deprivation of other rights of the detainees. Part III pro-
poses that the DOJ vindicate the detainees' privacy interest the right way:
by determining the detainees' wishes and naming or not naming them ac-
cording to those wishes.
I. THE ARGUMENT FOR PERSONAL PRIVACY
The essence of personal privacy of the "informational privacy" genus
is one's control over the dissemination of information about her. The con-
cem is that an individual be able to keep others from giving publicity to
"private facts" about her-her criminal past, financial or medical informa-
13See infra text accompanying notes 34-39.
14See discussion infra Part 11.
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tion, personal habits and more. 5 Applied to the names of individuals de-
tained by the government, the argument is that the fact of one's arrest upon
merely an accusation of wrongdoing is "private," at least insofar as the
detainee's identity is concerned, and disclosure of her name would cause
her embarrassment or offense (or worse) and would serve no legitimate
public interest. This, again, is precisely the DOJ's privacy argument with
respect to the post-9/1 1 immigration detainees.' 6
No statute, rule, or court decision prohibits the naming of individuals
detained or arrested for immigration violations on the grounds of personal
privacy--or at least none did until the DOJ created one in April 2002.'7
Attorney General Ashcroft initially asserted that such a law existed," but
both he and a DOJ subordinate subsequently admitted in Congressional
testimony that none did.' 9 Nevertheless, in response to a lawsuit seeking
the names of the detainees under FOIA, the DOJ has argued that privacy
concerns justify withholding the names of post-9/11 immigration detainees
15 See, e.g., John A. Jurata, Jr., The Tort that Refuses to Go Away: The Reemergence of Public
Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 489 (1999) (chronicling the evolution of the "pri-
vate facts" tort and surveying its applications).
16See DOJ FOIA Memorandum, supra note 5, at 23-24.
17See 67 Fed. Reg. 19,508, 19,509-19,510 (Apr. 22, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 236.6)
(citing concerns about detainee privacy and national security to justify new rule barring disclosure of
names of immigration detainees and any other information about them) (citing, inter alia, 28 C.F.R. §
513.34(b)) (barring disclosure of "[I]ists of Bureau [of Prisons] inmates" on grounds of "individual
privacy"); see also infra note 20. Otherwise, immigration hearings are open to the public, though
judges may limit or bar attendees because of space limitations, or "[to] protect[] witnesses, parties, or
the public interest." 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.27 & 240.10; cf Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1977)
(noting.discretionary authority under analogous predecessor rules to close deportation hearing to pro-
tect safety of alien who alleged fear of persecution in home country). Applicants for asylum do, how-
ever, categorically receive confidential treatment, through a rule forbidding public disclosure of infor-
mation "contained in or pertaining to" their applications. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (2001); cf Guevara Flores
v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1251-52 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing rule in context of applicant who alleged
fear of persecution in home country). Proceedings concerning "abused alien spouse[s]" and "abused
alien child[ren]" are also closed to the public. 8 C.F.R. § 3.27(c) (2002). And exclusion hearings-
hearings to determine an alien's admissibility under now-superseded rules-are also closed. 8 C.F.R.§§ 3.27 & 240.32 (2002); see CHARLES GORDON ET. AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.01
(Rev. ed. 2001) (explaining elimination of "deportation" and "exclusion" distinction by creation,
pursuant to Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, of uniform "re-
moval" proceedings for immigration cases beginning on or after April 1, 1997). The DOJ has also
sought to withhold information about post-9/i I immigration proceedings by means of two other post-
9/11 directives that do not expressly invoke privacy concerns; see infra note 20.
IS See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces the Appointment
of the Special Master to Administer the September I I Victim Compensation Fund, at 5 (Nov. 26,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll_27.htm (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review):
It would be a violation of the privacy rights of individuals for me to create some kind of list
of all of [the detainees who] are being held .... The law properly prevents the department
from creating a public black list of detainees that would violate their rights.
19 See U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-V7) Holds Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy: Hearing on
Anti-Terrorism Policy Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001), Fed. News Serv., Nov. 28,
2001, LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednews File (statement of John Ashcroft, United States Attorney Gen-
eral); Chertoff Testimony, supra note 4.
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because of the stigma and related harms the detainees may suffer from
being named. 2' The DOJ grounds this argument in FOIA Exemption 7(C),
which allows the government to withhold information "compiled for law
enforcement purposes" when the information "could reasonably be ex-
pected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'" The
statute does not define what information the exemption covers; the matter
is therefore left for the courts to decide, and for us to explore in the mean-
time.
An individual may very well be harmed by public knowledge of her ar-
rest for alleged immigration violations in the same ways she might be
harmed by public knowledge of her arrest for alleged criminal behavior-
embarrassed by the accusation of wrongdoing, her family members
shunned, her future job prospects threatened, and her social status dam-
aged. And we can safely assume that any possible harm from public
knowledge of immigration accusations is both more likely to ensue and
more serious in our post-9/11 world. I would therefore argue that, for pri-
vacy reasons, the DOJ may very well be entitled, indeed perhaps should be
20 See DOJ FOIA Memorandum, supra note 5, at 23-24. The DOJ has made the same argument,
so far unsuccessfully, in three other lawsuits that challenge the withholding of information about post-
9/11 detainees. See ACLU v. County of Hudson, No. 82D-L-463-02, at 9 (Super. Ct. N.J. March 26,
2002) (seeking information about post-9/l 1 detainees held in New Jersey state facilities under state's
"right to know" laws) (granting summary judgment for plaintiffs), available at http://www.judiciary.
state.nj.us/ditalia/aclu.htm (on file with the Connecticut Law Review); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,
195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (seeking public access to immigration proceedings in-
volving particular post-9/ll detainee) (granting preliminary injunction for plaintiffs); North Jersey
Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D. N.J. 2002) (seeking public access to
immigration proceedings involving post-9/1 I detainees) (granting preliminary injunction for plaintiffs).
The latter two suits challenge a much-maligned post-9/l 1 directive detailing "additional security pro-
cedures" for immigration hearings involving post-9/l I detainees, including closing the courtroom to
the public and not releasing any information about the case. See Memorandum from Michael Creppy,
Chief U.S. Immigration Judge, on Cases Requiring Special Procedures, to All Immigration Judges and
Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/court/creppy memo.pdf [hereinafter
Creppy Memorandum]. The DOJ's new regulation forbidding public disclosures of information about
all immigration detainees, including their names, see supra note 17, was apparently issued in response
to these two suits. Meanwhile, even more apparently in direct response to the pending suits, a freshly-
minted rule allows immigration judges to issue protective orders to bar immigration respondents and
their attorneys from divulging information about immigration proceedings. See 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799,
36,802 (May 28, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.46); cf. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at
948 (finding DOJ's asserted interests in closing post-9/l I immigration proceedings insufficient to
support closure because, inter alia, "the Government [does not] prohibit detainees. .. (or their counsel
or families) from revealing ... information [about the proceedings] to the press and public."); North
Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301 ("[T]here is nothing... to prevent disclosure of ... in-
formation by the ... detainee or that individual's lawyer").
21 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000). The DOJ's other arguments for withholding the names, see
supra note 5, rest on two other FOIA exemptions: the exemptions for information that "could reasona-
bly be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), and for informa-
tion that "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual," id. §
552(b)(7)(F). DOJ FOIA Memorandum, supra note 5, at 14-23.
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required, to initially withhold the names of post-9/11 immigration detain-
ees-at least until the "master calendar hearing," when an administrative
judge first sees an immigration detainee and reviews the charges against
her, and the detainee informs the judge whether she concedes her deport-
ability or plans to contest it.22 But the DOJ should withhold a detainee's
name on privacy grounds only if the detainee desires anonymity. Con-
versely, if a detainee desires publicity, she should be able to achieve it-
through the government's release of her name or by other means.23
22 Alas, no statute or regulation defines a "master calendar hearing" or specifies how soon after
arrest it must take place, how it must be conducted, or precisely what must occur during it. Immigra-
tion judges themselves are uncertain about the definition and requirements of the hearing. See, e.g., In
re Cordova, No. A91 432 440, 1999 WL 590719, at *3 (BIA Aug. 6, 1999) (interim decision):
Neither the [Immigration and Nationality] Act nor the regulations define a "master calendar
hearing." However, we understand such a hearing to be a preliminary stage of the proceed-
ings at which, even though little or no testimony is taken, the Immigration Judge has great
flexibility to identify issues, make preliminary determinations of possible eligibility for re-
lief, resolve uncontested matters, and schedule further hearings. In addition, this is the stage
of the proceedings at which the Immigration Judge generally ensures that an alien has been
advised of his or her rights under the Act and applicable regulations, including rights to ap-
ply for relief, and has been given notice and warnings regarding his or her obligation to at-
tend future hearings, file applications and evidence in a timely manner, and otherwise
cooperate with orders of the Immigration Court.
Id. See also In re Arguelles, No. A73 000 231, 1999 WL 360383, at *10 (BIA June 7, 1999) (interim
decision) (Grant, Board Member, concurring):
[Alliens may be confused-as apparently are Members of this Board on occasion-as to ex-
actly what constitutes a "master calendar" hearing. The term is not defined in the regula-
tions. In some jurisdictions, virtually all merits cases are preceded by the type of "master
calendar" that most closely resembles a "docket call" or "status call" in state and federal
trial courts. In other venues, cases are efficiently disposed of during the first and only ap-
pearance before an Immigration Judge .... I would ... suggest that at each hearing, Immi-
gration Judges state for the record what type of hearing is occurring-a master calendar or
an individual merits hearing.
Such a hearing clearly should take place, however. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.26(b)(1)(i)(A) (2002) (requiring
alien's request for voluntary departure instead of deportation to be made at or before "the master calen-
dar hearing at which the case is initially calendared for a merits hearing").
23 Given the comparatively less procedural protection accorded immigration arrestees, the propo-
sition that the government should be required to release an arrestee's name if she wishes is arguably
stronger in the immigration context than in the criminal context. A necessary premise of the privacy
protection I urge in the criminal context is that criminal arrestees, through constitutional requirements
such as court-appointed counsel and a prompt judicial probable-cause hearing after a warrantless arrest,
have the ability to publicize their status if they wish. Immigration arrestees do not enjoy the same
protections: there is no analogous right to court-appointed counsel in immigration proceedings, nor is
judicial review required before or after an immigration arrest. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000) (statutory
right to counsel in removal proceedings only "at no expense to the Government"); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(2000) (authorizing arrest and detention of aliens upon warrant issued by Attorney General); 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.5(e)(2) (listing titles of immigration officers empowered to issue and execute arrest warrants); 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2000) (warrantless arrests of aliens reviewed by immigration officers); United
States v. Encamacion, 239 F.3d 395 (1 st Cir. 2001) (judicial hearing not required until criminal charges
filed against alien arrested for immigration violations); but see 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1) (2000) (statutory
right to court-appointed counsel in "alien terrorist" removal proceedings). This is all the more true with
respect to post-9/l I immigration detainees, with the procedural rights of immigration arrestees lowered
even further since September II. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
[Vol. 34:1169
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Both of these propositions stem from the very essence of informational
privacy. The first proposition-that the DOJ should withhold a name only
if the detainee so desires-is axiomatic; only the detainee's interest in ano-
nymity triggers the relevant privacy interest to begin with. The second
proposition-that a detainee should be able to disclose her name effec-
tively if she wishes-rests on the idea that privacy means not merely an
individual's ability to withhold personal information, but something
broader: an individual's choice of whether or not to withhold personal in-
formation, and when and to whom to disclose it if she chooses to.24 In this
sense, informational privacy is about more than just protecting against em-
barrassment or indignity; it is about vindicating one's autonomy--one's
control over information about herself, in the words that constitute its stan-
dard definition.25 This is in fact the precise interpretation that at least one
court has given the privacy interest protected by FOIA Exemption 7(C).26
A detainee's privacy-as-autonomy interest is served only when she decides
whether or not the fact of her detention should be publicized. The DOJ
should therefore base any decision to withhold a detainee's name on pri-
vacy grounds only on the wishes of that detainee.
In fact, the DOJ cannot use Exemption 7(C) to withhold the name of
any immigration detainee who wishes to be named. Published cases that
consider whether the exemption covers the identities of individuals de-
tained by the government while awaiting the filing or resolution of crimi-
nal or immigration charges are virtually nonexistent. 7 Courts have, how-
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), § 412(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2001)) (allowing detention of
non-citizen arrestees suspected of terrorism for up to seven days before criminal or immigration
charges are filed, and indefinitely thereafter); 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 287.3 (Sept. 17, 2001)) (extending period by which immigration charges must be filed after
arrest from twenty-four hours to forty-eight hours, and allowing immigration detention without charge
for "reasonable period of time" beyond forty-eight hours in "emergency or other extraordinary circum-
stance"); see also Administrative Comment, Indefinite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment
on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397 (2000-2001) (arguing
that immigration detention without charge beyond twenty-four hours under post-9/11 detention regula-
tion violates Fourth Amendment and due process rights).
24 See, e.g., Jean L. Cohen, The Necessity of Privacy, SOC. RES. (2001), at 319 ("Privacy rights
do not silence; instead they protect communicative liberty: the freedom to choose whether, when and
with whom one will discuss intimate matters.") (arguing for a constitutional right to privacy).
25
.See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
26 See Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Exemption 7(C) leaves the decision about
publicity-whether and how much to reveal about herself-in the power of the individual whose pri-
vacy is at stake.") (upholding DOJ refusal to disclose documents that identified FBI agents) (citing
United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989)
(informational privacy "encompass[es] the individual's control over information concerning his or her
person") (upholding DOJ refusal to disclose prior arrest record of individual under Exemption 7(C))).
27 The closest case appears to be Brady-Lunny v. Massey, 185 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (C.D. 111.
2002) (citing Exemption 7(C) in allowing Illinois state officials to withhold names of federal detainees
held in state facility, "[s]ome of [whom were] ... merely witnesses and detainees who ha[d] not been
charged with or convicted of crimes," since releasing information about them would "stigmatize" them
2002]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
ever, repeatedly upheld the government's use of the exemption to withhold
the identities of past targets of criminal investigations, noting the embar-
rassment that can result from public knowledge that an individual was once
investigated for or suspected of crime.2" Suspects in ongoing criminal in-
vestigations also find their names protected from disclosure under Exemp-
tion 7(C). 29  Assuming as We have that public knowledge of one's post-
9/11 immigration detention can be as stigmatizing as public knowledge of
one's status as a criminal arrestee or suspect, the exemption thus might
encompass the privacy interest the DOJ asserts.3° For the DOJ not to name
and "cause what could be irreparable damage to their reputations"). In ruling for the plaintiffs in the
Michigan suit seeking the opening of immigration proceedings involving a post-9/1 I detainee, the trial
court mentioned the DOJ's privacy argument but noted that the name of the detainee at issue at already
been disclosed, and thus did not address the argument. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d
937, 947 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
28 See, e.g., Safecard Seres., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("There is little
question that disclosing the identity of targets of law-enforcement investigations can subject those
identified to embarrassment and potentially more serious reputational harm. . . . Recognizing this
danger, Exemption 7(C) affords broad[] privacy rights to suspects, witnesses, and investigators" (inter-
nal citations and quotations omitted)) (declaring names and addresses of private individuals appearing
in law enforcement files categorically exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(C) absent showing
that disclosure is necessary to confirm or refute compelling evidence that agency is engaged in illegal
activity). See also Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2000) (remanding for trial court to consider
privacy interests of individuals including "third-party suspects" under Exemption 7(C) before ordering
disclosure); Halpem v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting, in terms of Exemption 7(C),
strong privacy interests individuals have in government information that suggests they were once
subject to criminal investigation).
29 See. e.g., Spirko v. United States Postal Serv., 147 F.3d 992, 994-95, 997, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(upholding redaction under Exemption 7(C) of information about possible suspects in ongoing criminal
investigation).
3 Less clear is whether the invasion of that interest would be "unwarranted" for the purposes of
the exemption-i.e., whether public interest in the names of the detainees outweighs the invasion of
personal privacy that naming them might constitute. Is there greater public interest in the names of
individuals who are currently detained by the government for investigation than there is in the names
of suspects who are not? If so, is that interest sufficient to justify the privacy invasion of naming them?
In my forthcoming work, I answer "no" to the second question (though "perhaps" to the first), in sup-
port of my argument for withholding the names of criminal arrestees and suspects until a probable
cause determination is made. Reza, supra note 9. My reason is that public knowledge of the identities
of individuals currently being investigated by the government, detained or not, is not necessary, or at
least is not necessarily necessary, to the public's understanding of government operations-the very
purpose of public access to government information to begin with. At least one source more authorita-
tive than I am has also suggested this. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1979)
("It is difficult to understand how publication of [an accused] youth's name is in any way necessary to
performance of the press' 'watchdog' role.") (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment striking down
state statute criminalizing identification of accused juvenile delinquent when press had acquired the
information through lawful investigative efforts). Rulings in FOIA cases also imply this answer, by
upholding the deletion of only identifying information from documents the government seeks to with-
hold under Exemption 7(C). See, e.g., Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting
that the exemption targets identifying information and remanding for determination of whether such
information can be redacted from withheld documents). And the FOIA statute itself lends support. See
5 U.S.C. §552(b) (2000) ("Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt ... ").
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post-9/1 1 immigration detainees who prefer anonymity-and an Amnesty
International report about the detainees indicates that many do3 -is
therefore arguably justifiable under Exemption 7(C). But other post-9/1 I
immigration detainees might choose to make the fact of their detention
public, indeed already have.32 Detainees who prefer publicity of that fact
disavow any privacy interest in it. Exemption 7(C) therefore cannot sup-
port withholding their names. And the DOJ cannot determine which group
a given detainee belongs to-which names it can withhold on privacy
grounds and which it cannot; who wants to be named, and who does not-
without determining each detainee's wishes. Thus, the fundamental
shortcoming of the DOJ's privacy argument is the DOJ's failure to consult
detainees to determine their wishes and to withhold or release their names
accordingly, absent legitimate other grounds for withholding them. Both
FOIA and the very meaning of informational privacy compel this.
The second problem with the DOJ's privacy argument compounds the
first: all indications are that the DOJ has significantly impaired the ability
of detainees to bring publicity to their status on their own. DOJ officials
have repeatedly stated that detainees are free to disclose their own names if
they wish,33 but the same Amnesty International report details otherwise:
lawyers and family members have had difficulty contacting detainees and
determining where, and even whether, they are being held;34 detainees and
their attorneys have gone weeks, sometimes months, without being notified
of the charges against them or even told whether the charges are criminal
or immigration-related;35 detainees' "ability to maintain contact with the
outside world" via phone calls has been significantly limited;36 and detain-
ees have reported difficulty understanding their rights and the means of
exercising them because of language difficulties.37 Detainees have also
apparently gone weeks, and some of them months, without legal counsel;3"
a "significant number" of detainees was possibly still without legal counsel
31 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra note 2.
32 See, e.g., id. at 29 (discussing "letters from prison" by detainee Rabi[h] Haddad); Steven Fai-
naru, Detainees Offer Glimpse of Life in N.Y. Facility: 3 in Sept. I I Probe Say They Were Abused in
Top Security, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2002, at Al (reporting descriptions of conditions of post-9/1I
confinement by three named recently-released detainees).
33See Ashcroft, supra note I and accompanying text; DOJ FOIA Memorandum, supra note 5, at
23; 67 Fed. Reg. 19,508, 19,509-19,510 (Apr. 22, 2002) (discussing new regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6,
forbidding disclosure of information about immigration detainees) (regulation discussed supra notes 17
& 20).




38 Id. at 18.
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as of late February 2002.39 Detainees who do not have access to lawyers,
family members, and even telephones cannot very well "make their iden-
tity public if they wish," and detainees who do not know what they are
charged with, do not understand their lawyers, or do not have lawyers at all
cannot meaningfully decide whether to name themselves in the first place.
The very circumstances of their detention thus effectively deprive post-
9/11 detainees of the ability to vindicate their personal privacy interest-
their right to control information about themselves. The DOJ is thus not
advancing this interest by withholding their names but defeating it-in fact
inverting it.
Both the weight and the sincerity of the DOJ's privacy argument are
also questionable. The government has readily named post-9/1 1 detainees
suspected of much more serious offenses than immigration violations.4 °
Surely the stigma and related harms from that public identification have
been greater for those detainees than could be the case for anyone named
as merely a possible immigration-law violator. And the government's
post-9/1 1 concerns about detainee privacy apparently do not extend to
those detainees whose attorney-client communications the government
intends to listen in on under the post-9/11 regulation allowing such moni-
toring,4' or to those suspects toward whom the government will direct the
new search and surveillance powers it obtained under the USA PATRIOT
Act.42 Indeed, the inescapable impression is that secrecy, not privacy, is
39 /d.
40 See, e.g., David Johnston & James Risen, Officials Say 2 More Jets May Have Been in the Plot,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at BI (reporting government statement that named San Antonio radiologist
was detained as material witness); David Johnston & Philip Shenon, F.B.L Curbed Scrutiny of Man
Now a Suspect in the Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at Al (reporting government statements of
suspicion that pre-9/l 1 immigration detainee Zacarias Moussaoui was suspected of being twentieth
hijacker); Ross E. Milloy, F.B.I. Holds Men Traveling with Knives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A2
(reporting FBI's naming of, and suspicion of 9/11 involvement by, two immigration detainees who had
been seized on September 12 on a train in Texas with box cutters, hair dye and a large amount of cash
after having been on a flight from Newark to San Antonio on September 11); James Stemgold, Man
Linked to Hijackers Is Granted Bail; San Diego Muslims Put Up Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at
B7 (reporting government statements that named post-9/l 1 detainee charged criminally with falsifying
his application for political asylum had assisted 9/l1 hijackers and had "radical Islamic writings" in his
San Diego apartment); cf James Stemgold, Muslims in San Diego Waver on Bail Pledge, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2001, at B6 (describing reluctance of Muslims in San Diego area to provide promised bail
money to post-9/l I detainee out of fear of being "stigmatized" through association with him). See also
Judith Miller, Pakistani Plotted to Bomb Florida Power Plants, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2002, at A13 (reporting government statements detailing early 2002 immigration arrest of, and DOJ
decision not to criminally prosecute, named 19-year-old South Florida man suspected of conspiring
with others in March and April 2001 "to acquire guns and explosives for a jihad against the United
States"); Qatar Student in Virginia Will Remain in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2002, at Al 2 (repeating
government's descriptions of evidence suggesting connection to 9/I1 attacks by named visa-fraud
arrestee).
41 See 66 Fed. Reg. 55,065 (Oct. 31,2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(c) & (d)).
42 See NANCY CHANG & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT:
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what the government seeks by withholding information about its post-9/1 1
law-enforcement efforts.43 Nor is post-9/1 I law enforcement the only area
in which the current administration has apparently confused the two con-
cepts." Thus, while there may be legitimate reasons for withholding the
names of post-9/1 1 detainees, DOJ concern for their privacy is plainly not
one of them.
II. ITS WRONGS FOR THE POST-9/1 1 DETAINEES
The DOJ's withholding of the post-9/1 I immigration detainees' names
has in this way inverted any privacy interest the detainees may have in the
fact of their detention. Indeed it has perverted that interest, since professed
concern for detainee privacy has contributed to the apparent deprivation of
a wealth of other rights the detainees are accorded under domestic and in-
ternational law. Amnesty International's report details the precise condi-
tions of the detentions and the relevant alleged legal violations: racial dis-
crimination, in violation of the United States Constitution and the Interna-
tional Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination;4
arbitrary arrest and detention, in violation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights;46 restrictions on visitors and communication
HOW THE USA PATRIOT ACT UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTION 4-9 (2002) (summarizing new law-
enforcement search and surveillance powers), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/whatsnew/usa_
patriot act.asp (on file with the Connecticut Law Review). Concern about informational privacy has
not been a hallmark of the current administration in other areas. See. e.g., Robert Pear, Bush Acts to
Drop Core Privacy Rule on Medical Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at Al (reporting on proposal by
current administration to drop federal rule promulgated by previous administration requiring doctors
and hospitals to obtain consent from patients before using or disclosing medical information for the
purpose of treatment or reimbursement).
43 See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Ridge Briefs House Panel, But Discord Is Not Resolved, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at A23 (noting Congressional concern over administration's "excessive secre-
tiveness with the Congress" regarding post-9/11 security efforts by homeland security director Tom
Ridge); Linda Greenhouse, Executive Decisions: A Penchant for Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, at
DI (discussing administration's efforts to withhold information about post-9/ll law-enforcement
efforts); Matthew Purdy, Their Right? To Remain Silent, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at B5 (discussing
the closure of post-9/11 immigration hearings despite the apparent lack of connections to terrorism);
Diana Jean Schemo, Plans on Foreign Students Worry College Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at
Al 5 (noting concerns of education officials that post-9/I I interagency efforts to change rules for stu-
dent visas are "largely hidden from public view").
4See, e.g., Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush Says Privacy Is Needed on Data from
Enron Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at Al (discussing President's refusal to disclose to Congress
information about contacts between failed energy corporation and administration's energy task force);
Don Van Natta. Jr., White House Could be Sued on List Access; Agency Seeking Names of Energy
Consultants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at Cl (describing Vice President Cheney's desire to protect the
privacy of individuals interviewed by the energy task force in order to ensure officials' cooperation in
the future).
45 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-5, 10-16.
46 See id. at 6 (citing international laws describing protection against arbitrary deprivation of lib-
erty as important human right).
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with the outside world, in violation of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and INS Detention Standards;47 deprivation of the right
to counsel, in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights;
48
failure to inform detainees of the charges against them and their rights in a
language they understand, in violation of the letter of the United Nations
Body of Principles and the spirit of the INS Detention Standards; 49 and
prolonged solitary confinement and other mistreatment in detention, in
violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.50 A
civil rights lawsuit filed on behalf of post-9/11 detainees adds, among other
things, allegations of unreasonable detention under the Fourth Amendment,
violations of due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment,
and deprivations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion."' The secrecy with which
the government has operated vis-i-vis the detainees has enabled it to effect
these alleged deprivations. Without the pressure of public scrutiny of its
actions, the DOJ has possibly violated domestic and international rules and
has done so with impunity, at least thus far. Withholding the names of
detainees and other information about them has been one lever for this
unchecked government power, and the argument for the detainees' per-
sonal privacy has been one of the operating mechanisns of this lever. In
this way the DOJ has perverted the detainees' privacy interest.
III. VINDICATING THE PERSONAL PRIVACY INTEREST OF POST-9/1 1
DETAINEES
The DOJ can easily protect the privacy of post-9/1 1 immigration de-
tainees by letting the detainees themselves decide whether or not they wish
to be named, and withholding or releasing their names according to those
wishes. This method is already embodied in immigration provisions that
protect the privacy of other subjects of immigration law enforcement. Ap-
plicants for asylum can consent to the release of information pertaining to
their applications,52 subjects of exclusion hearings can request open hear-
ings,53 and proceedings involving "abused alien spouses" can be opened if
47See id. at 28-30 (describing instances of harsh detention, including prolonged solitary confine-
ment).
48 See id. at 15-17 (describing instances of denied access to legal counsel).
49See id. at 23-25 (describing inadequate or nonexistent access to interpreters or translators).
50 See id. at 33-40 (describing allegations of physical and verbal abuse, including "inhuman
physical restraints" on detainees).
51 Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 02-CV-02307-JG (E.D.N.Y. 2002), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocts/docs/terrorism.
52 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) (2001); see also supra note 17.
53Id. § 240.32(a); see also supra note 17.
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the spouse agrees" 4-in fact, immigration judges are required to ask abused
alien spouses whether they request closed proceedings." Broader legisla-
tive precedent for giving the privacy decision to the concerned individual
also exists. 6 And a judge presiding over one of the post-9/11 lawsuits
against the DOJ has now noted precisely that shortcoming of the DOJ's
privacy argument in rejecting the DOJ's efforts to close post-9/11 immi-
gration proceedings." Indeed, the DOJ must determine the wishes of post-
9/11 detainees in order to comply with FOIA's disclosure mandate, since,
as argued above, FOIA compels the DOJ to release detainees' names in
response to FOIA requests (absent other grounds for withholding the
names) if the detainees so wish. I, moreover, would argue that even if
FOIA did not require it, the government should base its disclosure deci-
sions on the wishes of individual detainees, withholding the names of those
who do not wish to be named and releasing the names of those who do.
Only this method properly vindicates a detainee's privacy interest in the
fact of his detention.
IV. CONCLUSION
Privacy concerns of the post-9/11 immigration detainees are thus prop-
erly addressed not by the DOJ's unilateral decision to withhold the detain-
ees' names but by the DOJ's release or withholding of the names according
to the wishes of the detainees. The DOJ's present stance has inverted de-
tainees' privacy interest by taking from them the power to control infor-
mation about themselves-the fact of their detention. And the DOJ has
perverted that interest by invoking it to strip away other rights from the
detainees-the very people for whom the DOJ professes such concern.
Post-9/11 immigration detainees might very well have a privacy interest in
the fact of their detention, but so far the DOJ is not vindicating that interest
by deciding on its own to withhold their names.
5 4 Id. § 3.27(c); see also supra note 17.
55 Id. § 240.1 l(c)(3)(i); see also supra note 17.
56 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000) (allowing disclosure of personal rec-
ords maintained by government upon written consent of person to whom records pertain); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 293(a) (2002) (requiring law-enforcement officials to inform sex-offense complainant of op-
tion to request that complainant's name not become matter of public record).
57 See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D. N.J. 2002) (to
extent Creppy Memorandum, directing closure of post-9/lI1 immigration proceedings, see supra note
20, rests on concerns about detainee privacy, "its mandates sweep too broadly because it does not
permit the individual to elect such protective treatment").
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